As the offseason winded down, so did the price for Michael Bourn. Bourn and his agent Scott Boras thought they had a chance at cashing in on a big contract, especially after B.J. Upton signed with the Braves for $75 million. However, for a variety of reasons, Bourn’s price dropped to the point where the Mets were now major players.

There was one sticking point for the Mets, however: the compensation pick they would have to give up. I agree with Sandy Alderson and the front office about this, and it was the right move to fight the compensation. Losing the pick would have huge consequences on the rest of the draft, well past the first round. Not only would the Mets lose their first-rounder if they signed Bourn, but they would also lose up to a third of this year’s draft budget. That didn’t make sense, even for a player of Bourn’s caliber.

The negotiations inched along, and rumors kept swirling. Eventually, it became clear that the Mets were the favorites to land the 30 year-old center fielder. It made sense for them as a team, and they were one of only a few clubs willing to come close to Bourn’s asking price. It got to the point where the Mets were in heavy negotiations with Bourn and Boras. According to Mike Puma of the New York Post, they even agreed to terms on money and years, and were just down to little details. So what went wrong? The draft pick compensation ruling.

The biggest mistake the Mets made was not appealing earlier. Jon Heyman of CBS Sports tweeted after the signing that the Mets were reluctant to appeal the rule in the CBA that forced them to give up their pick until they had first signed Bourn, fearing that once it became public, Bourn would have more leverage and drive the price up. They were right, and the price of Bourn would have increased once it became known that they were appealing. What upsets me most isn’t their strategy once they were in the final stages with Bourn, it’s the lack of preparedness the Mets showed in this situation. Why they didn’t appeal on Day 1 of the offseason is unbelievable.

Even if Alderson had doubts the team would be able to sign a big free agent, he should have made that option available from the beginning. They were too passive in that sense before the rumors with Bourn even began to surface. Why not take care of (or at least fight) that issue before it can become a problem? If they knew that this issue would take a few days (or even a few weeks) to resolve, why wait? (The MLBPA is in the same boat.)

The other side of this is how Major League Baseball handled this. They too, were passive from the beginning, refusing to go to an arbitrator until Bourn agreed to terms with the Mets. They didn’t want to make a ruling on this matter and set an unwanted precedent. I get that. However, the way they milked and manipulated this situation was wrong. They told the Mets to agree with Bourn and then go to an arbitrator. But the longer Bourn was left on the market, the less patient he  would be in waiting for a ruling. All Major League Baseball had to do was wait, and they would not have to get that ruling. And that’s exactly what happened.

It’s disappointing the Mets missed out on Bourn. He was a very talented player and one who could have helped the team greatly over the next few years. His price was a little high, but very fair when you consider some of the other free agent outfielders who signed multi-year contracts this winter.

I have been a fan of Sandy Alderson from early on, and still am. I like the overall direction he is taking the organization and the emphasis on a strong core of cheap, young stars. That’s the way you build championship teams. But he messed up here. He is going to take a lot of heat if he fails to address the outfield. It isn’t completely his fault (Major League Baseball deserves as much blame) but had he been more aggressive in fighting this compensation rule, Michael Bourn might be a New York Met.

While I still support Alderson, his passiveness was too much this time. There is a saying that in order to truly appreciate something, you must concede its faults. For Alderson, passiveness is one of them.

No, it sure wasn’t easy to give up the reigning Cy Young award winner. How often do these special players come around, especially in the Mets organization? Plus, he was signed for just $5 million next season. Seems like a no-brainer — for a conventional pitcher perhaps. However, the situation the Mets and Dickey were in was one that no one has ever seen before. Not only was Dickey a knuckle ball pitcher (and those are a rarity now), but he had a completely different career path than most, one that made his future uncertain. Maybe with a “regular” knuckle ball pitcher at 38 years old, it would be safe to assume that they can continue at the same level of production for another four or five years. But with Dickey having spent most of his career as a conventional pitcher and missing his UCL (a ligament in his right elbow) nobody is sure how his arm will wear down as his career progresses. My guess, considering the fact that he throws a very hard knuckle ball, is that Dickey can be very good for another two years, and decent after that. With his value so high at the moment — the highest it will ever be — trading him to a team willing to take the risk made sense. It only takes one organization that thinks he can go another five years pitching as well as he has to make a deal worthwhile. Giving up a reigning Cy Young award winner will leave a bad taste in the mouth of some Mets fans, but the uncertainty and quality of the package the Blue Jays offered made it more than bearable.

One thing that must be considered is the window of winning. Dickey, at best will likely be dominant through 2014. The window the Mets have to make a run at the division is 2014 and beyond. The two time periods don’t match up well. Dickey would be on the decline as the rest of the team was improving. The added fleibility the Mets will get in those years by having young players in their pre-arbitration years making the minimum instead of $12 million or more for Dickey is another point to be considered.

Now let’s take a look at the trade itself. Along with Dickey, the Mets cleared Josh Thole and Mike Nickeas from the roster, two of the worst (at least last year) hitting catchers in baseball. Here’s how they compare to the rest of the league:

Sandy Alderson didn’t really give up anything of value here. Without Dickey, they no longer needed catchers who could catch the knuckle ball. The Blue Jays almost did the Mets a favor by taking those two.

The Blue Jays’ package is where this trade gets interesting. Toronto dealt the Mets three prospects — Travis d’Arnaud, Noah Syndergaard, and Wuilmer Becerra – as well as John Buck. Two of these prospects (d’Arnaud and Syndergaard) are now easily considered two of the three best Mets prospects. Let’s take a look at what to expect from the two of them.

Travis d’Arnaud

d’Arnaud was the centerpiece of the deal, and rightfully so. The 6’2″ catcher has the potential to be the next great Mets catcher. He has the ability to hit for average, as well as power. He’s also athletic behind the plate. Here’s what Baseball America says about him:

He’s a rare catching prospect that projects to hit in the middle of a lineup. He is an above-average hitter who should hit for at least average power. He doesn’t walk much but makes consistent hard contact, getting hits even when his timing is off or he gets off balance. He has the bat speed and strength to hit plenty of homers and lets his power come naturally, employing a short stroke and all-fields approach.

Speaking of Baseball America, d’Arnaud was ranked 17th overall last year, and will surely be higher in this year’s list. Since 2000, there have only been eight catchers ranked 17th or better: Devin Masoraco (has had minimal MLB playing time with the Reds), Jesus Montero, Victor Martinez, Joe Mauer, Matt, Wieters, Buster Posey, and Carlos Santana. When a catcher is ranked this high, they are probably going to be very successful.

d’Arnaud, in my opinion, will be at worst, a serviceable catcher who hits ten home runs and bats .260. At best, he is a 25 home run hitter who can bat .300. He’s not quite Mike Piazza at the plate (not as much power) but he can certainly be a dominant force in the middle of the Mets’ lineup.

Noah Syndergaard

The Mets managed to snag another top prospect from the Blue Jays: pitcher Noah Syndergaard. Syndergaard is a big 6’5″ righty who has a mid-90s fastball and very good control. Last year in the Low-A Midwest League, he went 8-5 with a 2.60 ERA in 103.2 innings, striking out 10.6 batters per nine innings while walking only 2.7.

The former first-round pick was ranked by MLB.com as the 83rd best prospect in baseball. In an e-mail exchange with Eric Simon of Amazin’ Avenue, Assistant GM Paul DePodesta had this to say about Syndergaard:

We see a big, physical presence who is athletic and a strike thrower. You just don’t see many guys his size at his age command the strike zone the way he has as a professional, especially with big velocity. In addition to the power, there’s also deception to what he does. As with D’arnaud, we’ll refrain from making any predictions as to where Noah will be next here until we have a better feel for him in spring training.

Ther have been comparisons here to Zack Wheeler. Both are tall, lanky right-handers with fastballs in the mid to high 90s. While Syndergaard doesn’t have the fantastic breaking ball that Wheeler does, he has much better control, even at a much younger age. Whoever you compare him to, he immediately becomes the third best prospect in the system without question. He has a bright future ahead of him, as does d’Arnaud.

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As a whole, this deal is quite a bargain for Sandy Alderson and the Mets. I have to applaud them for holding out for two top 100 prospects, even though very few people thought they could actually get that kind of return. Fans were dismayed by the trade the Royals proposed, asking for Dickey and Zack Wheeler in exchange for just Wil Myers. That gave me a bad feeling that teams weren’t going to put much value in Dickey, but it turns out I was wrong and thankfully so. The team got two high-profile prospect, and a third one who could be very significant down the road who I have only mentioned briefly. To reiterate: it is tough to part with Dickey, but for the package that the Mets got, it may very well look like a huge steal down the road.

Check out more of my work at Up Along First.

Let’s start off by giving you some background information. One win last season (1 WAR) cost teams an average of about $5.5 million. Now, that number is going to rise dramatically over the next few years as more multi-billion dollar television deals keep rolling in and teams have more money to spend. We have only really seen the beginning of what could be a huge increase in player salaries over the next ten seasons.

Wright over his career as a full-time third baseman (2005-present) has averaged about 5.5 WAR per season, including last year’s 7.8 mark. Bill Petti of Fangraphs did an experiment to predict the value of his contract in dollars using his projected wins above replacement. Here’s what Petti projected:

There are two things that we have to consider here. One, we don’t know exactly how Wright is going to decline. My guess is he will decline much slower than this data suggests, mainly because of the exceptional durability Wright has shown over the years, playing over 155 games in five separate seasons. The second is, as I mentioned earlier, the rise in price per win. Petti projects the increase to be about five percent each season. I think it could grow even faster as the television deal boom continues, which would mean that this deal will look better over time.

Out of curiosity, I wanted to look into how players who put up similar numbers to Wright compared in the twilight of their careers. For that, I used Baseball-Reference’s similarity score. I looked at five of the top players (three of them third basemen) based on these scores through the age of 29. Below is a chart depicting how these players declined from the age of 30 onward using fWAR (Fangraphs’ version of WAR). Here it is:

 Unless Wright is the next Del Ennis, who at age 33, just stopped being productive and was out of baseball one year later, these projections look almost conservative compared to the other declines. Is David Wright worse than Scott Rolen? I think there just about on par with each other. Petti is using a standard approach to a player’s decline, but I think Wright’s decline could be slower than it is projected to be.

One aspect that I haven’t talked about yet, something that you can’t put a numerical value on but is certainly something to consider, are the intangibles Wright brings to the team. Those can’t be measured like wins above replacement, but when you’re talking about intangibles, Wright definitely helps the team. He is reportedly a great leader and role model in the clubhouse for younger players. And with the Mets getting younger, it’s important to have at least one steady veteran around. Plus, the PR factor that he will bring to the team now that he is a “Met for life” is incredible. (I would finally be comfortable buying an expensive David Wright jersey.) He is now the undisputed face of the franchise. Wright is everything that can be asked for in a role model and captain of a team. You can’t put a monetary value on that but regardless of what you think about the idea of having a leader or captain, it certainly at least adds some value.

Right now, it certainly feels like Wright got paid way too much in this deal, but there’s another side to it. When it’s all set and done, Wright may have been worth $20, $30, or even $40 million more than what he signed for if he stays healthy. So say what you will about the risk involved in terms of health, contracts similar players signed, or the finances of the organization, but this deal looks like it will be looked at very positively down the road.