The farm system may be in much better shape, and their projected 2014 payroll will be in the bottom of the majors for now – potentially opening a lot of financial flexibility going forward. However, is doom and gloom in store for the 2013 edition of the Mets? Or can they win the WAR?

While I´ll acknowledge that Wins Above Replacement is a somewhat flawed method of measuring talent – especially considering the flaws of defensive stats in this metric – it is still a sound way to judge a team overall.

So, the question is, what kind of an impact have this offseason’s transactions had on the team’s WAR compared to 2012? And how will it evolve in 2013?

Let’s examine the situation, and for those of you wondering, I’ll be using Baseball Reference’s version of WAR to conduct my analysis.

2013 Rotation: Net Gain 0.5 WAR

RA Dickey and his 5.6 WAR is gone, as are Chris Young (0.7 WAR) and Mike Pelfrey (0.9 WAR). In all likelihood, Chris Schwinden and his -0.6 WAR won´t return either. So, overall, 6.6 in WAR have to be made up and accounted for – a daunting task indeed.

Newly acquired Shaun Marcum posted a 1.3 WAR in 2012 and a 2.9 WAR in 2011. Splitting the difference, let´s assume his 2013 WAR will  2.1 as one member of this rotation.

The rest will have to be made up in-house.

Matt Harvey posted a strong 1.6 WAR in one third of a season. Since I very much believe in him, let´s assume he doubles his 2012 totals (tripling it would seem a bit outlandish). So, there´s a 3.2 WAR and thus a gain of 1.6.

Jonathon Niese had a 3.2 WAR in 2012. Let´s assume he matches that again this season and doesn´t take a step forward. Thus,.no change.

Dillon Gee posted a 0.8 WAR in 2012 while missing almost half the season. Let´s say he´s 100% back and almost doubles his previous total to a 1.5 WAR in 2013.

That leaves Johan Santana and his 0.1 WAR for 2012.

Santana’s WAR through June would was closer to 2.0 prior to his collapse over his final ten outings of the season. Let´s assume, he pitches to a modest 1.0 WAR for half the season and then gets replaced by Zack Wheeler for the other half who does half as well as Matt Harvey did in his debut. Overall, we can expect a 1.8 WAR from both of them combined.

Finally, we have Collin McHugh who made a few starts and posted a -0.9 WAR in 2012, thanks to a couple of atrocious outings late in the year while due to fatigue. Let´s assume he performs at a 0.0 replacement level.

Taking all of that conservatively projected data into consideration along with the historical data leads us to this conclusion.

The Mets needed to make up for the loss of 6.6 in Wins Above replacement.

When you calculate Marcum’s 2.1 WAR, plus the net gains of Harvey (1.6 WAR), Gee (0.8 WAR), the 1.7 WAR we could get from the Santana and Wheeler combination, and McHugh (0.9 WAR), it results in a total net gain of 7.1 in WAR.

So, overall, the rotation gains half a win vs. 2012.

2013 Bullpen: Net Gain 4.5 WAR

The Mets had one of the worst bullpens in the league in 2012.

Frank Francisco – in an injury riddled season posted a – 0.7 WAR and now seems DL bound for an extended period of time. Jon Rauch, Ramon Ramirez and Tim Byrdak (due to injury) are all gone from the 2012 cast and overall they combined for a 0.0 WAR last season. Manny Acosta and his -1.2 WAR is headed to Japan. Miguel Batista and his -0.2 WAR will write his poems for the Braves in 2013.

Meanwhile, the Mets have brought in Brandon Lyon (1.2 WAR in 2012), RH Scott Atchison (1.7 WAR in 2012), Pedro Feliciano (0.0 due to missing the season), Aaron Laffey ( 0.2 WAR) and LaTroy Hawkins (- 0.1 WAR). I´ll assume only Lyon, Atchison and Feliciano land a spot and replace Rauch – Ramirez – Byrdak. Conservative as I am, I´ll pencil in Lyon & Atchison for half as good a season and Feliciano as neutral. Gain: 1.5

Acosta is replaced in-house by either Jeurys Familia or Greg Burke. Since I like the latter ones quite a bit, I´ll project them as a +0.8 WAR reliever combined. Gain: 2.0

Finally, Josh Edgin posted a – 0.1 WAR in 2012 in his brief debut. Blessed with a power arm, he does modestly decent and finishes with a 0.4 WAR overall. Gain: 0.5

FF returns at some point and remains a disappointment. But instead of – 0.7, only is a – 0.2 reliever in 2013. Gain: 0.5

Parnell repeats his 2012 season as the new Mets closer.

Adding everything up, the bullpen turns from atrocious to a solid average. Yet, an overall gain of 4.5 Wins.

2013 Infield: Net Gain 3.5 Wins

Most of the 2012 Infield is back. David Wright – Ruben Tejada – Daniel Murphy – Ike Davis combined for a 10.5 WAR in 2012 – in spite of Murphy learning a new position,  Ike being limited by valley fewer, Tejada missing an extended stretch of time, and Wright being almost unprotected in the lineup most of the season.

The average age of the four regular infielders entering 2013 is 26.5 and thus pretty close to the prime years for a baseball player. Let´s assume Wright regresses slightly from 6.7 to 4.5, however Tejada improves from 1.9 to 2.5 over a full season, Murphy´s defensive improvements over the 2nd half of the season last to bring his WAR up from 1.2 to 2.0 while Ike finally has the break-out we´ve all been expecting and plays defense like in 2011 and 2010 to post a 3.0 WAR vs. 0.7 in 2012. Overall, that´s a gain of 1.5 Wins from these 4 players.

The backup infielder Cedeno (+ 0.3) is replaced by Hicks (-0.1) or Quintanilla (+0.5). Splitting the difference, this remains unchanged.

At Catcher, Josh Thole (- 0.1) gets replaced by John Buck (0.4 WAR in 2012) for a gain of half a win.

Backups Mike Nickeas (-0.7) and Rob Johnson (-0.2) are replaced by Anthony Recker (0 WAR in 2012) and Rookie Travis D´Arnaud. Being very conservative, I´ll give the latter two a combined 2013 WAR of merely + 0.6. Still, overall, that´s a 1.5 WIN gain vs. the terrible 2012 backup combo.

Adding things up, the catching improves by 2 Wins, the Infield by 1.5 wins for a total of + 3.5 wins.

 2013 Outfield: Net Gain 3.0 Wins

Ah, the outfield. A collection of rejects and suspects that has lost Scott Hairston (+ 1.5) and Andres Torres (+ 1.2) and Jason Bay (- 1.3 WAR in 2012). Total loss: 1.4 WAR.

Among newcomers, Collin Cowgill (+ 0.3 in limited action in 2012) figures to double his AB for a total WAR of + 0.6. Marlon Byrd (- 0.5 in 2012 but 1.7 in 2011) and Andrew Brown (-0.1) are competing for a spot. Let´s assume, overall they post a 0.4 WAR, so the new guys combine for 1.0 WAR.

That leaves things up to returnees.

Lucas Duda combined disappointing offense and horrible defense in RF for a – 1.4 WAR in 2012. With an easier assignment in LF and a better offensive approach, he emerges as a modestly solid player to post a 0.6 WAR – for a 2 WAR gain overall.

Kirk Nieuwenhuis had his ups & downs and finished with a 0 WAR in 2012. At age 25, he´s poised for modest improvements and an expected WAR of a conservative 1.4 – which is still below average for a CF but certainly realistic.

Finally, Mike Baxter and his 0.3 returns to RF. He probably is what he is and remains unchanged.

Still doing the math, the outfield gains 3.0 Wins overall and “improves” from atrocious to well below average in 2013.

Overall Net Gain 11.5 Wins

Now of course, it only February 26 and a couple of the players here may change for a myriad of reasons as Spring Training battles are waged in St. Lucie, but we have a good case here to believe the Mets as currently constructed can out produce what they did in 2012. Even with the key losses of R.A. Dickey and Scott Hairston.

All included, the 2013 Mets gain 11.5 wins vs. their 2012 counterparts. Please note that these projections do not include monster-breakouts for anyone. Just gradual improvements which you´d expect for generally young players and no crippling injuries.

Adding 11.5 wins to a total of 74 wins in 2012, you get to 85.5 wins. Not good enough to beat the Nationals for the division and probably behind the Braves as well. But certainly good enough to challenge the Phillies for 3rd place in the NL East and thus compete for the second Wild Card in the NL. And if players such as D´Arnaud, Wheeler, Ike or Duda really happen to break out in a big way, there´s upside for an even higher total. But let´s stop dreaming and “only” look at a glass that could be a lot closer to “half full” than people realize.

The Bat Phone (Photo by MMO’s Clayton Collier)

Sandy Alderson was quoted yesterday that he doesn´t think the Mets are “far away” from contending at this point. While pretty much everyone agrees that the Mets Infield looks pretty good now & going forward and the rotation at the very least has the potential to become a true asset, the outfield & bullpen remain the most troubling areas on the roster.

It seems apparent that the outfield situation won´t  get fixed from within but that the Mets -  be it sooner or later – will need to add talent from the outside via free agency or trades. Unless you believe that the current ownership group still remains in severe financial distress, there should be plenty of money available to potentially invest into the outfield for 2014 & beyond.

However, the bullpen may be an area where the Mets won´t need to invest a lot of money, yet still have the upside for a quick and massive turnaround. Just to point out how mediocre (or terrible and inefficient   the Mets bullpens have been for quite some time, take a look at the performances over the past 10 seasons:

2012: 458.2 IP, 237 ER, 4.65 ERA, 1.39 WHIP

2011: 474.0 IP, 228 ER, 4.33 ERA, 1.45 WHIP

2010: 481.0 IP, 192 ER, 3.59 ERA, 1.38 WHIP

2009: 501.2 IP, 217 ER, 3.89 ERA, 1.43 WHIP

2008: 493.1 IP, 234 ER, 4.27 ERA, 1.40 WHIP

2007: 511.2 IP, 229 ER, 4.03 ERA, 1.36 WHIP

2006: 542.2 IP, 198 ER, 3.28 ERA, 1.21 WHIP

2005: 413.0 IP, 180 ER, 3.92 ERA, 1.44 WHIP

2004: 520.1 IP, 226 ER, 3.91 ERA, 1.40 WHIP

2003: 492.1 IP, 236 ER, 4.31 ERA, 1.46 WHIP

During that time, the Mets have featured  a grand total of 3 (in words THREE)  relievers who came up through the Mets farm system (or were still quite young, regardless of where they came from) who provided 50+ innings of relief during any of those seasons, namely Aaron Heilman (from 2005 through 2008), Joe Smith (in 2008) and Bobby Parnell (in 2011 and 2012).

The only other two useful  “homegrown” Mets relievers over that span have been Heath Bell & Matt Lindstrom who went on to have solid careers elsewhere but were traded away prior to their success. The Mets bullpens usually were made up of very expensive veteran closers in addition to a couple of – often  ineffective – and modestly  expensive setup relievers and several veterans or Quadruple-A pitchers that were brought in on the cheap and rarely made a difference.

The one bright spot was the 2006 Cinderella season during which Duaner Sanchez, Chad Bradford, Pedro Feliciano and Darren Oliver – along with Heilman – formed a very strong setup corps for Billy Wagner for one season until injuries, age, free agency and other issues led to a quick demise. Other than that – through four different GMs over that span btw – the results have been somewhere between mediocre to awful. And if you want to see one common theme that has plagued most recent Mets teams, it´s been a rather shaky bullpen.

Could the utter  lack of youngish / inexpensive / non-overused relievers be related to this lack of success ?

Take a look at the 2012 Oakland A´s bullpen which beyond veteran Grant Balfour featured a bunch of no-name guys, mostly youngsters who weren’t deemed capable enough as SP.

Ryan Cook, Jerry Blevins, Jordan Norberto or Evan Scribner among several others weren’t exactly household names prior to 2012, yet combined with the rest of the A´s pen produced a  2.94 ERA and 1.17 WHIP over 512 IP, allowing 167 ER. And thus better numbers than any Mets pen of the past 10 years has ever posted.  For less cost than any Mets bullpen between 2003 and 2012, I might add.

Likewise, the Atlanta Braves bullpen of 2012, obviously led by the “super-season” of homegrown flamethrower Craig Kimbrel posted a 2.76 ERA in 486.1 IP (149 ER) and a 1.19 WHIP. Kris Medlen, Cristhian Martinez, Cory Gearrin and Johnny Venters – all young & homegrown pieces contributed along with inexpensive veteran scrap heap pickups Eric O´Flaherty & Chad Durbin. Again, at less combined cost than any of the last 10+ Mets bullpens  (thinking about it, probably less than any of the past 25+ Mets bullpens)…

Entering 2013, there finally seems to be help on the very near horizon. For now, 15 pitchers figure to compete for 7 bullpen spots out of spring training – about  half of them young / inexperience / inexpensive:

1. Frank Francisco
2. Bobby Parnell
3. Brandon Lyon (apparently)
4. Josh Edgin
5. Scott Atchison
6. LaTroy Hawkins
7. Greg Burke
8. Jeurys Familia
9. Pedro Feliciano
10. Robert Carson
11. Elvin Ramirez
12. Darin Gorski
13. Alex Torres
14. Jeremy Hefner
15. Aaron Laffey

So, at the very least and unlike most past springs, the Mets have a bunch of options to choose from for a variety of roles. By the end of the 2013 season Gonzalez Germen, Jack Leathersich, Cory Mazzoni, Jacob DeGrom, Jenry Mejia (if he doesn´t start),  Armando Rodriguez or Collin McHugh (if he doesn´t start) also all could well emerge as viable candidates for bullpen roles going forward.

By spring of 2014, there´s a very strong chance that for the first time in decades (early / mid 1980s ?), the Mets could finally feature a young & inexpensive  group of relievers  instead of an aging, overpaid and mostly mediocre bullpen.  While there´s obviously no guarantee it works, there are plenty of options to choose from and it´s the one area – sort of under the radar – where a team can improve substantially in a hurry by easily shaving off 50+ runs allowed per season at small cost. That alone can be worth a 5+ win swing in any given season (general rule of thumb: 10 Runs – whether they are saved or scored  = 1 Win). . Compared to the awful 2012 version, that´s probably up to 8 extra wins.  And it doesn´t take a lot of wishful thinking to see it happen during the upcoming one or two seasons based on the depth of young pitching on the rise beyond the “big names”.

To summarize, as of today, it doesn´t look as if the farm system left behind was all that good. And one  big reason for the Mets´ recent and even current struggles is directly related to the lack of quality (not quantity of ) higher end homegrown talent that Minaya left behind for his successor.  Don´t get me wrong, the system wasn´t barren either as some members of the media suggested back then. But if you take a closer look, it was mediocre at best – especially if you´re looking for potential short- and midterm help for the major league roster. And the effects are lasting.

Now, a few acknowledgements before I get into details:

1. I very much respect Omar Minaya, one of the nicest persons you´ll find in all of Baseball.
2. He did a good job, building what he was asked to do initially, i.e. a “quick fix winner” shortly after he took over. He had a “ Midas” touch for pretty much everything he did in the 2005/2006 off-season.
3. Minaya inherited a great inexpensive duo of budding young stars in Wright & Reyes and a few solid MLB veterans (Floyd, Cameron, Benson, Glavine, Trachsel and what was left of Leiter) but little else and especially a terrible and dysfunctional farm system thanks to bad drafts in 2004 and 2003, giving away Scott Kazmir and an otherwise poor 2002 draft too and no International talent beyond Carlos Gomez.
4. While Minaya wasn´t exactly prudent in terms of handing out longterm contracts to expensive veterans, especially backloaded deals that were bound to turn into ugly gorillas by the end, even with good luck, he couldn´t foresee Bernie Madoff being a crook and the cash pipeline drying up. Still, while it wasn´t his fault that the payroll got out of control and the Mets fielded a couple of very expensive .500ish type teams (that finished below .500 due to injuries), he does deserve some of the blame for that.
5. His longterm legacy in the Mets´ history books may be a building a functional Latin American talent procurement and development pipeline that should help the Mets longterm  – even if the effects were quite small in late 2010 when he departed and may not be in full work until maybe 2015 or so. And it goes beyond signing promising young talents such as Domingo Tapia, Hansel Robles, Vicente Lupo or Wilfredo Tovar that were still signed under Minaya – but also for talent technically signed during the Alderson tenure – but on the groundwork that Omar Minaya laid there.

That said, the 2005 through 2010 draft record, i.e. the 6 drafts Minaya & his staff ran – for now – is rather pedestrian. Now, if Matt Harvey turns into the NL version of Justin Verlander or Jon Niese goes on to become the NL version of Jon Lester, then this will look a lot better a few years from now. However, if you want to know a key reason why the Washington Nationals and Atlanta Braves are favored to win in 2013 and not the New York Mets, finances aside, you can look at the production of their 2005 through 2010 drafts and compare it to the Mets.

While “wins above replacement level” (WAR) is certainly far from perfect, it provides a useful & neutral tool to assess the quality of player procurement.

I looked at the drafts by the Mets, Nats and Braves from 2005 through 2010 and added up the “WAR” totals produced by those classes through the 2012 season. At least the classes of 2005 through 2008 can fully be assessed today. It´s still a bit early for a verdict on the classes of 2009 and 2010, though first results are already quite useful.

So, there you go, combined “WAR” totals of these 6 classes as of today:

1. Nationals 74.8 WAR
2. Braves 55.6 WAR
3. Mets 23.5 WAR

See a trend ?

The Mets had their most productive “class” in 2006  for now with a combined WAR (including some negative WAR) of 11.1, mostly thanks to underrated Daniel Murphy (6.7) and Joe Smith (5.0). The class of 2005 comes in 2^nd for now at 6.9 with Pelfrey (4.5) and Niese (3.8 – but improving fast) leading the way, with negative WAR backup C Drew Butera (traded for Luis Castillo) hurting the overall total a bit. 2007 has been a disaster for now at 0.6 combined – mainly thanks to Dillon Gee  at 1.9 but otherwise mostly “negative” WARs from Lucas Duda or even Eddie Kunz.

2008 has Ike Davis at 5.0, some hope for Kirk Nieuwenhuis at a neutral 0.0 but deductions for Schwinden, Satin and for now McHugh who have all provided negative value for a final total of merely  3.1 at this point.

The 2009 class is a complete bust for now, with not a single major leaguer graduated and no prospects anywhere close to the majors or likely to even get there. Matt Harvey and his 1.9 WAR for starters may end up being the best pick in the entire Minaya draft era and is the leader of the still very fresh class of 2010. Deducting slight negative value for Josh Edgin gets us to 1.8 for that year as of now – hopefully rising very soon.

Overall, as of now, not a single “difference maker” was procured in those 6 drafts. Matt Harvey hopefully will change that. Ike Davis, Jonathon Niese, Dillon Gee and Daniel Murphy should end up with at least solid lengthy major league careers when the book is closed. Still, it´s tough building a legit contender through one potential stud pitcher (who had yet to throw his first pro pitch at the time Minaya left) and a handful of solid complementary players. And there´s not too much hope for future breakouts left in these college-heavy Mets classes either. Sure, Jacob deGrom, Matt Den Dekker or Cory Vaughn could still become solid major leaguers along with Edgin from the 2010 class. Nieuwenhuis & Duda may seize their chance in 2013 and also emerge as longterm complementary pieces instead of the merely “replacement level” fillers they have been for now. But this certainly is not what you´d call a “good farm system” in retrospect – regardless of 2010 rookie status – or a “strong nucleus of young talent” to inherit along with a bloated payroll.

And while I mentioned that I like the International pipeline installed by Minaya going forward , fact is, as of today, Ruben Tejada is the lone International signee of the Minaya era that has had any sort of impact at the major league level (career WAR of 3.3). Maybe Jenrry Mejia, Jeurys Familia, Jordany Valdespin and Wilmer Flores will prove Jim Callis & friends wrong and  eventually make an impact. But do you see any building blocks there, realistically ?

Meanwhile, while the Nats lucked into high end # 1 overall picks, Stephen Strasburg & Bryce Harper, those two – for now – only make up 10.7 WAR of the lofty 74.8 total. Other key contributors are Ryan Zimmerman (28.7 !) , Jordan Zimmerman (8.6), Danny Espinosa (5.5), Ross Detwiler (2.1), Drew Storen (2.8), John Lannan (6.3) or a couple of youngsters that were traded for Gio Gonzalez like Tommy Milone (2.5) or Derek Norris (0.6).

The Braves – in spite of winning more games than the Mets over this period – have procured studs like Jason Heyward (14.3), Yunel Escobar (18.5 quite a player until he struggled), Craig Kimbrel (6.2), Kris Medlen (6.2), Tommy Hanson (4.7), Freddie Freeman (3.3), Andrelton Simmons (2.8) and Mike Minor (- 0.1 but very promising), most of which figure to generate a lot of future value too.

Oh, and by the way, none of the three teams has graduated any players from the classes of 2011 or 2012 to the majors yet. The Nats did use 2011 pick RH Alex Meyer to land OF Denard Span this winter.

To summarize, while the Mets currently have a 40-man roster mostly made up of players that were procured during the Omar Minaya era, most of these players – unfortunately – aren´t very good. Combine it with a shoe-string budget and you are pretty likely to end up with a pretty mediocre team.

Which doesn´t mean that Sandy Alderson hasn´t made his share of mistakes already – but may explain why this is a much broader procedure than it may seem. Regardless of who the GM is today or going forward.

“The Plan” – or trying to see the future forest amidst a bunch of presently broken trees.

We may agree or disagree on whether the current rebuilding of the Mets was inevitable or necessary or strictly financially motivated or even a vicious attempt to alienate the fan base. We may agree or disagree on whether the current front office has done well in their dual task of a) saving the ownership group from losing the franchise – whether we like it or not –  and b) laying the groundwork of a longterm winner both talent wise and by creating a lot of payroll flexibility again.

However, what seems clear is that the future of this franchise over the next several years largely depends on the quality of pitching it will produce from within or acquire via trade & free agency. That seems to be the plan.  And we´re not only talking about Matt Harvey or Zach Wheeler, but also about having enough depth and a strong bullpen to go with hopefully strong frontline SP.

Since teams like Washington & San Francisco have been mentioned as potential “role models” in all of this, I took a brief look at how those two teams did over the past 4 seasons in terms of scoring runs & allowing runs and what the actual difference between them and the Mets has been over that span. Also, let´s take a step back and look at the financial implications as well.

What´s pretty interesting is that all 3 teams have scored a very similar amount of runs over that 4-year span:

Washington: 2.718, i.e. an average of 679.5 Runs per season

San Francisco: 2.638, i.e. an average of 659.5 Runs per season

New York Mets: 2.691, i.e. an average of 672.75 Runs per season

None of these numbers is very high. However, all three teams play at least half of their games in at least slightly pitcher-friendly environments.

You guessed it – the main difference between the three teams has been the pitching:

San Francisco over the past 4 seasons has averaged 90 wins per season by allowing merely 2.418 Runs overall and thus 604.5 Runs per season on average.

The Nationals – after being terrible in 2009 and 2010, allowing 1.615 Runs in those two season and thus a whopping average of 807.5 per year – have merely allowed 1.237 Runs in 2011 and 2012 for an average of 618.5 Runs per season – or almost 200 less than before. Correspondingly, after averaging 63.5 Wins per season in 2009 & 2010, the Nats have now averaged 89.5 Wins per season in 2011 and 2012, while actually scoring a few runs less in those two years combined than in 2010 and 2009.

Finally, the Mets have given up by far the most runs among these teams over the past 4 years, a whopping 2.860 total and thus an average of 715 Runs per season. While the offense has been on par with the Nats & Giants, giving up 100 or so Runs more per year has been the back-breaker for recent Mets teams and thus has led to an underwhelming average total of 75.5 Wins per season during that span.

So, yes, using the Nats & Giants as role models may not be a bad idea. Building a strong & deep pitching staff over the next couple of years along with depth in the minors to be able to sustain it via trade or further promotions from within seems to be the formula to proceed with. And it has nothing to do with “Moneyball” but a lot more with common sense. And if it works, the Mets will be in a great position to sustain it financially over the long haul since revenue should rise significantly with a winning product on the field. Average 90 wins per season and I´m pretty sure Citi Field will be a crowded place again.

Oh, I almost forgot looking at finances which seem to be such a prevalent issue here these days:

The San Francisco Giants – who have won 2 World Series over the past 4 years while barely missing the playoffs in the other two – have spent an average of $107.442 million per season on their last 4 teams. Starting with an $82.566 million payroll in 2009 and recently culminating with $131.980 million spent on the 2012 World Champions.

The Nats – over their past two competitive seasons – have averaged payrolls of merely $82.681 million after being below $70 million in each of their dreadful 2009 and 2010 seasons. Even in the 98-win season of 2012, however, they spent merely $94.568 million in total salary on players.

The Mets – who have failed to even crack .500 in any of those past 4 seasons – had to spend a whopping total of $517.953 million over that span for an average of 129.488 million per year, starting with $153.550 million in 2009 to a mere $94.508 million in 2012 – or about the cost of one Rule V pick less than the Nats spent on their 98-win team.

And while you can witness a gradual rise in payroll for the Giants & Nats as their initially young team has started to age and become more expensive, the Mets have actually managed to remain a mediocre 75-win caliber team while cutting costs by almost $60 million per year total from their record in 2009 all the way to 2012. As of today, that total for 2013 figures to remain in the $95 to $100 million range, though the actual payout will be much lower due to deferred payments to Santana, Wright and Bay and probably in the $75 to $80 million or so range once the roster is completed. Looking at 2014, for now, we´re looking at a projected payroll in the $60 million range for the Mets – and thus plenty of room to get it into a range that is deemed necessary to start a competitive run again. Be it 85 or 95 or 105 million dollars.

Still, leaving out any individual decisions on players over the past couple of years or how good you believe the talent evaluation skills of the current front office are or aren’t, the general “Plan” sounds like a very sound strategy if you look at how the Nats & Giants have been successful with it, doesn’t it ?

Has it been an effective method to reduce injuries to pitchers ? I don´t know. One thing to keep in mind is that only for the past 10 to 15 years max, Baseball teams have started to really protect the arms of their prized pitchers, especially young ones in their first couple of seasons in the majors or post surgery. Remember how “Generation K” was “abused” by Dallas Green & friends in the mid 1990s before this became common knowledge ? 120+ pitch starts have become a rarity in today´s game – basically only when a pitcher has a no-hitter or at least a shutout going or is on historic strikeout pace. So, the historical evidence one may bring up from examples of the 1970s, 1980s or 1990s as pros or cons for the benefit of 5-man-rotations vs. 4-man rotations seems flawed anyway. That besides much improved methods of detecting arm issues today (and handling them) than 20 or 30 years ago – so increased odds that arm issues will be detected – but not in career ending fashion like in old times.  To avoid boring you with possibly outdated data, I suggest you Google studies on the 5-man or 4-man rotations where plenty of stuff can be found on the Internet – but is not too helpful IMHO.

Now, no team in Baseball I can think of, has ever really tried going with a 6-man rotation or at least a modified “5 ½ man-rotation” for an extended period of time.  Except maybe for brief stretches of carrying a surplus starter here or there based on too many worthy rotation candidates with a DL returnee. Or at times late in a season with the team already out of contention to try out multiple options for future seasons. No team has specifically used this model over an entire season yet.

Before I explain why I believe 2013 would be a perfect time & situation for the Mets to give this idea an extended look, I will acknowledge that the main reasoning against the 5-man vs. the 4-man rotation obviously also applies to the 6-man rotation vs. the 5-man rotation:

“Your best starting pitchers get fewer starts and somebody who wouldn’t be good enough to even crack the rotation normally gets a bunch of starts instead”. Sure, if you have Justin Verlander or CC Sabathia, heck even RA Dickey on your staff, I very much get the point. And if depth is an issue anyway, it becomes an even larger one with 6 instead of 5 rotation gigs to fill.

However, the 2013 Mets as of today will have a starting rotation of mostly youngish pitchers, plus a couple of pitchers returning from shoulder injuries. In each case, one big goal has to be getting the arms as safely as possible through the typical injury nexus period (ages 19 through 24) and obviously try to avoid further injuries anyway, especially considering the financial implications.

One possible way to achieve that could be using a “5 ½” man rotation, i.e. 5 starters on regular turn and a spot 6^th starter who chips in when there aren’t off-days or rain-outs to keep starters on 5 or 6 days of rest instead of the traditional 4 and otherwise serves as a long reliever.

While I acknowledge that the sample size is quite small, there are a couple of factors that point to a very significant upside in this approach. And given that the 2013 Mets may not be favored to go deep into October anyway, the downside seems pretty modest.

1. Higher Effectiveness and More Innings From Your SP

Last season – whether it was by design or not – Jon Niese & Matt Harvey received an extra day or two of rest quite often. And the difference in performance was stunning (I only counted starts of regular 4-days rest vs. starts of 5 or 6 days of rest, leaving out starts with longer rest that usually won´t happen under normal circumstances).

Niese & Harvey made a combined total of only 13 starts on 4-days rest. Here are the combined numbers:

77.2 IP, 78 H, 49 R, 46 ER, 14 HR, 30 BB, 59 K´s, 5.33 ERA, 5.97 IP on average per start, 6.85 K´s per 9 IP

Meanwhile, the two made a combined total of 22 starts with 5 or 6 days of rest. Here are the numbers:

142.2 IP, 118 H, 38 R, 36 ER, 10 HR, 37 BB, 126 K´s, 2.27 ERA, 6.48 IP per start, 7.95 K´s per 9 IP.

And quite interestingly, the average number of pitches thrown per start was 98.2 on 4-days rest and 101,94 on 5 or 6 days of rest. So basically for half an extra inning per start you they needed to throw merely 4 pitches – and due to much higher success probably at lower stress levels – both mentally and physically.

So, basically,  these rather extreme results are the difference between a mediocre # 5 starter on regular rest and an ace on 5 or 6 days of rest for a similar number of innings – albeit less stressful ones.

If this isn’t merely a small sample sized fluke but rather a real effect of extra rest, let´s project the numbers over a full season:

Just instead of the standard 33 starts for a healthy full-time member at the front-end of a 5-man rotation, let´s do a projection for a member of a “5 ½ man” rotation who only gets  29 starts (162 regular season games would mean 27 starts average for each member of a 6-man rotation  – however with All Star break & off-days, 29 starts seems like a realistic projection):

29 starts x 6,48 IP per start = 187.92 IP – or almost the number of innings you wouldn’t want Matt Harvey to exceed over his first full MLB season anyway. And where Zach Wheeler or Jenrry Mejia (if he´s a SP longterm) could get in a best case scenario by the 2014 season…

So, compared to a 33-start SP who may only average  6 IP or so per start (i.e.198 IP over a full season), you only lose a dozen or so innings overall – but those you get may well be far, far more effective as  you also probably save 25 or 30 runs in the process, if not more.

Also, by going deeper into games, there´s lesser need for fringe average middle relievers such as Manny Acosta or Ramon Ramirez last year to enter a game in the middle innings. Basically, except for the dozen or so IP you lose in this projection overall and the 15 extra starts or so going to the new 6^th starter / long reliever, you take away a bunch of innings from the middle relievers. And thus, overall, your team may not be worse off using a mediocre # 6 spot starter such as, say Jeremy Hefner or Aaron Laffey for example.

Obviously, you don´t want to bounce a highly paid or touted young arm around in such a role. But give it to a strike-throwing back-end type who may be happy to just pitch in the majors and the results should be acceptable. In the grander scheme of things, the number of innings, say Niese + Acosta + Ramirez combined for in 2012 stay the same – but instead they go to Niese + maybe Hefner. So, in all this, what you gain by having someone like Niese to be more effective has to be worth more than what you lose from Hefner pitching more instead of, whoever Acosta or R.Ramirez are on the 2013 Mets. Considering how mediocre and inconsistent most middle relievers are, not a bad risk to take and definitely worth a try.

2. Better Health

In the minors, the Mets have already been going with a 5 or 6 days of rest routine for most of their farm teams over the past two seasons. And the result  has been an unusually low amount of arm injuries to the young pitching prospects – a refreshing change from the past.  Again, the sample size is just as small here. But if 25 out of the 25 or so regular minor league SP manage to stay reasonably healthy getting 5+ days of rest between starts instead of 4, maybe it´ll also help keep arms healthier (and more effective) at  the major league level. So, this is already a widely used approach at the minor league level – and really the reason it got me thinking.

3. Depth

The one big organizational strength right now is a deep pool of young pitching.

This entire thing only works if you have the depth to run out 5 qualified starters on a regular basis, plus have enough options for to serve as the  # 6  starter / long reliever (at times, you may need to move pitchers up & down from the upper minors if someone has to leave a start early or in case of doubleheader for example).

As of today, the 2013 rotation is Niese – Harvey – Santana – Gee and for now probably Mejia or C.McHugh or Laffey in the # 5 spot, though a free agent signing like C.Young or S.Marcum seems likely to get Mejia and McHugh a few more starts at AAA to work on their command and secondary pitches.

Along with Wheeler and Gorski, the Mets should have 4 pitchers in the Las Vegas rotation who could be longterm fits in the rotation – with all due respect to Chris Schwinden and Gonzalez Germen who probably won´t be full-time SP in the majors unless they develop an RA Dickey type knuckleball. McHugh, Gorski and Germen also have in common that they throw strikes. And even if Wheeler and Mejia eventually occupy spots in the regular rotation, McHugh, Gorski and maybe Germen could soon “challenge” Hefner or Laffey in the spot starter / long reliever role going forward.

And I´m not even talking about the next wave of young pitching in the mid & lower minors that could be ready to challenge by the second half of the 2014 season, now led by Noah Syndergaard, Rafael Montero, Michael Fulmer, Domingo Tapia and several others.

4. Summary

All in all, even based on this – granted small sample sized – evidence both at the major league and minor league with the 2012 Mets, going with a 5 ½ man rotation looks like a very intriguing idea – and quite possibly an invention that could lead to a lot more short term success than we anticipate right now and maybe healthier & more effective starting pitchers overall.  At worst, it´ll limit innings of our prized young arms for the time being.