And tell us what the runner OB did to make the batter hit the ball someplace good so he could score…

Wave his hands?
Scratch his groin?
Blow a tobacco laced Spit Bubble?
What did that guy on the base do to CAUSE the batter to hit the ball someplace good enough so he could run and touch home plate….

You got anything? NO!

The BATTER CAUSES the run to score and to get MORE runs to score you need more of what CAUSES runs to score!

Not more of what 70% of the time just SITS THERE because the batter didn’t do enough to CAUSE him to score!

Otherwise why replace a Giambi who was a sabermetrically good player and replace him with some cheapo guy who they thought could be as good because of his OBP…

Your not fooling anyone….

Did it?

The ENTRIE THING Is about MONEY!
They may use Sabers and look for stats they feel are undervalued as they did with OBP

But never once did they use the sabers to find who was the BEST at what the Sabers told them and sign him!

Not if he was a WELL PAID PLAYER…..

Red Sox didn’t throw out the entire top of the list of performers in thier valued Sabermetric….
Oakland did which is the MAIN difference between what Oakland did and what Boston did and why Boston won a WS NOT DOING MONEYBALL while the A’s never won DOING it!

The ony reason why Sabers were mentioned in the book is because it would have been 43 pages long if they just wrote “We went after cheap players who had a high OBP and traded away our best performers we didn’t want to pay for cheap kids”

THATS how!

Without Player B no one scores! Which makes him the CAUSE of BOTH runs…without Player B doing something at the plate you get ZERO RS!

Hence the CAUSE of the RS!

“the number of base runners doesn’t increase the likelihood of scoring?”

To that, the answer is a definite yes. But don’t forget I added “I personally feel that it a correlation of both, men on base and clutch hitting and neither can produce a run without the other”.

That is why I didn’t get into the debate. Everyone is correct as to the likelihood of scoring but that “It depends upon the makeup of the team itself. It’s not a black and white answer and why anbody here – my cyber friends from both sides of the fence – are expounding so much energy on this one point, I really don’t know because there are those intangebles that cannot be measured.”

That is why I vetted the opinions of all sides – to formulate my own opinionon regarding the best type of methodology and those who appear best qualified to understand that – based on the arguments made by all those involved. It is not from my own experience but being a juror on the argument handed the case and told to go into deliberation.

Did I tell anyone how to hit? Did I tell anyone to be prepared to hit on the outside? Did I say the Mets were telegraphing their hitting approach? Did I make up the stats about OBP ranges from decades ago? Did I make up the words spoken by Hudgens, LaRussa, Francona, James, Ojeda, etc? Did I make up the fact of what Casey Stengel, John McGraw and others knew long before saber stats? Did I not read up extensively on Bill James as per the attachments I posted in which he was speaking instead of going by third party explanations? Did I make up the idea that “correlation does not imply causation” or was that from experts in the field?

And did I note do extensive research on Sandy Alderson – his life prior to and after becoming a baseball executive and how he learned to understand baseball in his own manner?

That’s how I came to formulate my opinion about stats, those who use them, and how they are used.

“What team did I play for”? Call it a degree and graduate work in history which taught me indeed to look outside the box as well and be careful in understanding where those whom one is reading about is coming from. Call it analyization too.

Oh, what team do you play for? Because otherwise, by your own standard, you should keep quiet too.

“Who gtes credit doesn’t matter just as the guy who got hit by the car gets credit for being in an accident the one who CAUSED the accident is key!”

You understand that there’s no accident without both participants correct?

“The runner on base didn’t CAUSE the RS and it’s dumb to look for something that can NOT cause an RS instead of something that DOES cause an RS if you want to INCREASE RS”

Really? So bases empty and a guy hits a single, how many runs did he cause to score? Now put a runner at third and have the guy hit a single, how many runs scored now? Similar situations, different results. It’s almost as if there were a prior action like I don’t know a runner getting to third, that combined with another action (the single) caused a run to be scored. Are you seriously trying to say that the only action that mattered was the single? Because I think both were necessary.

Oh Metsie, you were so close, I really thought you had it this time.

You should ask your friends Jessup and Xtreeme if they think that is true….

Why are you still posting you lost the bet?

The conquest of baseball by Moneyball methods was formally sealed in 2004, when the Red Sox of John Henry and Theo Epstein won the club’s first World Series since 1918. In 2007 they won another. In a way these were triumphs for Beane, but they weren’t visible triumphs.

Once almost everyone in baseball went Moneyball, the A’s lost their advantage.

http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/columns/story?columnist=olney_buster&id=1792101

But Boston plays the “Moneyball” style — never bunt, don’t take chances on the bases, sit back and let your hitters hack away and do the work regardless of the game situation, regardless of the identity of the opposing pitcher. Other teams — the Anaheim Angels and the Florida Marlins, most notably — prefer to use their outs productively, by bunting, employing the hit-and-run; they put runners in motion and emphasize aggressive base-running as part of a larger strategy to put pressure on the opposing pitcher and the defense behind him.

http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2011/11/rise-and-fall-moneyball

A year after the book appeared, the Boston Red Sox, with the 30-year-old Yale graduate Theo Epstein as general manager, won the world series of 2004 using Moneyball methods. In 2007 the Red Sox won again. Other teams began hiring Epsteins and Beanes rather than clubbable ex-players. Last season only three of 30 GMs in the major leagues had played professional baseball, none of them very successfully. Beane has ended up restricting job opportunities in baseball for people from backgrounds like Beane’s….The New York Yankees recently hired 21 statisticians, Beane marvels.

http://sonsofsamhorn.net/topic/68317-the-red-sox-and-moneyball/

http://msn.foxsports.com/mlb/story/Moneyball-theory-still-relevant-to-mlb-8-years-later-but-debate-has-shifted-092011

John Henry, whose ownership group purchased the group in December 2001, wanted to apply principles from his success in the investment world to sports — and objective analysis was part of his mandate.

Henry offered Beane a record contract for a GM — five years, $12.5 million. When Beane said no, Henry turned to a Beane admirer, Theo Epstein, who had graduated from Yale and was then 28.

“Even before the book came out, even before Theo actually had the job in Boston, we had been friends,” Beane says. “He believed in some of the metrics available.

“Then, when John Henry bought the Red Sox, you had an owner that had a belief system in objective analysis. When he buys one of the biggest franchises in the game and hires a guy like Theo, that was a big accelerator.

“You could see it coming. There was an underlying current going on with some of the teams, and first and foremost with the Red Sox.”

For me, it started in San Diego, working for a small-market team,” says Epstein, who spent five seasons in the Padres’ baseball operations department before joining the Red Sox as an assistant GM in March 2002.

“I spent the vast majority of time focused on players who were undervalued for some reason or another, trying to build value through small acquisitions, through looking at players through a slightly different lens than the marketplace.

“When I got to the Red Sox, our roster at the time had plenty of star power, but the second half of our roster was not strong. It was a nice opportunity to apply those principles in roster construction to a big-market club.”

Three undervalued players — first baseman Kevin Millar, third baseman Bill Mueller and designated hitter David Ortiz — were among Epstein’s initial acquisitions. The 2003 Red Sox came within five outs of reaching the World Series. The ’04 Sox won the Series, ending The Curse of the Bambino once and for all.

The ’07 Sox featured three prominent Epstein draft picks – second baseman Dustin Pedroia, center fielder Jacoby Ellsbury and closer Jonathan Papelbon – and won the Series again.

“The 2003-04 teams that Theo assembled had a Bill James-type textbook offense,” Henry says, referring to the influential sabemetrician who is now a senior advisor with the Red Sox.

“The 2007 team had young players drafted with certain principles now widely employed. But our success has been in being very aggressive on all fronts including scouting and player development – all while continually drafting near the bottom.”

The Yankees, a perennial post-season qualifier, also held low draft positions. When Cashman secured more power before the 2006 season, one of his goals was to improve the team’s farm system. At the time, the feeling among many rival executives was that the Red Sox were about to blow right past the Yankees.

Cashman, in his quest to play catch-up, hired Joe Kerrigan, the Red Sox’s former pitching coach and manager who had been replaced at the outset of the Henry regime.

“How they approached their pitching program was of interest to me,” Cashman says. “I was throwing out much more (pitching) talent than the Red Sox had and they were having more success. It goes to execution, game plans, stuff like that.”

Cashman’s shift toward statistical analysis caused friction with then-manager Joe Torre, who said in his book, “The Yankee Years,” that he told the GM to remember the human element, and “never forget that there’s a heartbeat in this game.
Joe Girardi replaced Torre before the 2008 season. The Yankees won the World Series in ’09. And today, they are among the most aggressive teams on the statistical side, with more than 20 people working on analytics, according to Cashman. The A’s, by contrast, employ one such person — “and he has a host of other duties,” Beane says.

Diamondbacks GM Kevin Towers, who worked a special assignment scout for the Yankees last season, says he was impressed that Cashman leans on not only a group of analysts led by Michael Fishman, a Yale graduate who is the team’s director of quantitative analysis, but also on top baseball people such as Billy Eppler, the team’s pro scouting director, and Gene Michael, a special adviser who is a former player, manager and GM.

“Cash does it the right way,” Towers says. “The way he works the room in meetings, it works. If he wants the analytical view, he asks (the analysts) a question and they provide the information. They usually only speak when asked.

“With the Yankees, it’s not, ‘these guys and us.’ They’re all kind of one.”

Which raises an obvious question, particularly at a time when baseball is seeking to enhance competitive balance in its latest collective-bargaining negotiations.

If high-revenue teams such as the Yankees and Red Sox are now as savvy as the A’s once were in exploiting market inefficiencies, what does that leave for the little guys.

http://excalibursportspage.com/2012/02/12/what-happened-to-moneyball/

The concept relies solely on computer printouts and statistical analysis, something that wasn’t used in baseball when Beane and Paul DePodesta introduced it into Oakland. But the Oakland model had its flaws that were never corrected, which, in turn, kept the Athletics from ever winning playoff series and advancing to the World Series. The Oakland model relied solely on a player’s ability to get on base, with the thinking that if enough guys get on base, the team will score enough runs. The older method, which looked at stolen bases and home runs, became obsolete.

That method worked to score runs, but it didn’t correct situational baseball deficiencies that matter in postseason play. The Red Sox worked on the theory by hiring statistical analysis’ guru, Bill James, and infusing him with a scientific model that was built around Epstein and his minions. The result was a hybrid school that valued some players but also looked at how to compete in situations, putting emphasis on a player’s ability to perform in certain scenarios. With the money and resources driving it, the Red Sox experienced the correction Oakland couldn’t because of a lack of resources and won two World Series.

In 2004, the Red Sox used their new method to trade Nomar Garciaparra for Doug Mientkiewicz, Orlando Cabrera, and, in an indirect manner, Dave Roberts. They did so under the computer model where they got three guys who could, statistically, get on base as much as much as Nomar did, while at the same time, improving their ability in situations.

Those situations were defense and the close, late-game ball game. The Red Sox understood that it didn’t matter if you could get on base in the playoffs because games were so uncertain in the playoffs. They realized that in 2003 when they lost to the Yankees; they lost games where Pedro Martinez pitched but won games where John Burkett pitched. There was no way to predict that, so they had to prepare for everything. By acquiring the players they got, they made up for the fact that they a) couldn’t steal bases and b) were terrible defensively, two things that Oakland outright rejected by saying a) they weren’t going to steal bases and b) they could teach anybody to play a defensive position in order to get him into the lineup.

In the end, the Boston Red Sox corrected that market issue and blew the lid off the moneyball secret. In the decade since their first World Series win, Major League Baseball has become a scientific stream of statistics for anything, finding new ways to compare who is better at one position than another.

And in that aftermath, the Red Sox themselves have been passed. In a past era, there’s no way the topic of compensation would’ve been such a hot button issue because the Red Sox would’ve taken a guy that was either overvalued or ridiculously undervalued. They’d have put an emphasis on getting a guy like Kevin Millar, which nobody understood when the Sox had to give up compensation to a Japanese team in order to keep him from leaving America. Instead, everyone knows what value is, and Epstein, the man who perfected it, stands in the way of the Red Sox’ computers, which he designed.