The question of how much Sandy knew and when has been debated often but notice the inconsistencies in the hypothetical answers to that question when those like myself introduce more pieces of evidence?

In my past comments on this, I went into detail to point out the catastrophic change of events regarding the Mets financial situation as a result of the Madoff situation in late 2008 and up to the hiring of Sandy and asked the question of how Sandy could not have been aware of the desperate situation he was getting himself into.

So many replied that he did not know of the situation, inferring that the Wilpons and Selig were not completely being frank with him beforehand. Now, it’s not just that information was held back during the interviewing process (which is odd that with the Wilpons facing such financial trouble they would not want to vet him intensely to determine if he was the correct individual to help them resolve their problem – which would mean opening up enough of the books to him to answer their questions) but that Alderson was now aware that the financial situation could be that bad a year later.

Lets go by what we do know now:

- The financial situation as it was then, which included not just the present situation but the upcoming near billion dollars in loans that ,due to the loss of Madoff money, the Mets were suddenly unprepared to pay back.

- The commissioner fully aware of the above and admitting he had taken steps to help the Wilpons not done with other owners facing the same problems in the past (Los Angeles, Texas and Montreal).

- The financial situation had gotten to the point that Mets did not have the money to meet operating expenses in October and financial institutions were no longer giving them further loans because they were (and still are, in fact) deemed too risky. Because of that, the Commissioner had to step in where he had not done so with others before (the above point).

- That action by the commissioner was taken the same month (October) that Sandy was interviewing for the job.

- Sandy was not interested in the job and loved what he was doing on behalf of MLB with the Dominican Republic.

- It was the commissioner who urged Sandy to seek the job of Mets GM.

Now, other things that we also know:

- So much of the Mets financial problems were being reported in the financial media already.

- The Mets were heavily invested and had made at least a billion dollars in profit through Madoff. Irving Picard had already been appointed trustee for the victims and taking major steps to recoup as much as he can.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recovery_of_funds_from_the_Madoff_investment_scandal#Irving_Picard.2C_Trustee

- In July of 2010 the Mets were already sued (I believe) independently for recovery of lost pension funds.

So at first it was contested that Sandy was unaware of how extreme the Mets financial problems were before he took over the job. Now, DrD., instead of not just being fully aware of the financial circumstances up to that point, you extend it by theorizing “I don´t think Alderson was aware that the financial situation would be that bad in late 2010.”.

Now, this is where many of us begin differing on assumptions.

1) As fans we were already aware of the severity of the situation from what was reported in layman’s terms. Sandy Alderson is no fan – he is a lawyer and corporate CEO and extremely qualified – more so than most others – to understand and appreciate what was even just publicly reported way more than we would. Being that astute legal mind and that corporate executive, he could easily decipher that and deduce what was happening by both the available figures, his knowledge of the corporate world and the steps he saw the Mets taking during 2009 and 2010.

2) Being urged so hard by the Commissioner to take over a job after telling Selig he had no desire to leave his current position that he loved so much – along with having no interest in the Mets GM opening and his own knowledge of the situation – it is hard to conclude that Sandy did not demand to know what was going on that would cause Bud Selig to push him so strongly toward considering that position.

3) Again, being the lawyer and CEO and after knowing officially the extent of the severity of the Mets financial situation as he took over the job (including that $25 million bailout) he was not blind to the situation regarding Madoff and not unable to anticipate on top of the financial mess they were in what the Mets could be facing due to the organization’s heavy involvement with Madoff and the overall $50 billion being sought by Picard.

4) And again, even without Piccard hanging over the shoulders of the Mets, Sandy was aware of their inability to meet their monthly financial obligations, the loans that were forthcoming and that their credit was non-existent with financial institutions no longer conducting further business with them in terms of loans or re-financing in fear of the team defaulting on their future payments.

5) When spring training opened in late February of 2011, Sandy was still telling the media that the Madoff situation had no affect on the way he could conduct business in his capacity of Mets general manager. That was now four full months into the job and nearly three months after Picard filed his civil suit against the Wilpons.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703296604576005672465685298.html

6) The Mets had lost $70 million in 2011. Sandy had already projected losses for 2012 and now with 2013. Irrelevant of the Madoff situation, how – after two months into the job – could he have he not foreseen losses for 2011 while publicly claiming the Mets were on steady financial ground? How could he not conclude – being aware of the financial situation at that time – that these losses would not sink the Mets further into a financial hole? How could he claim it wasn’t a matter not having the money to retain the current roster payroll but rather not having the “additional” resources to spend at that time which would be resolved once the Mets disposed of the contractual obligations after 2011?

Taking these six points into consideration and still hypothesizing “I don´t think Alderson was aware that the financial situation would be that bad in late 2010.”only concludes that he must be a bigger dope than I am.

Is he?

I wish the SOB were still alive so that he could die a longer…slower…and more painful death

He is responsible for the fall of the NY Mets in the mid 1970′s, He might as well have been a southern plantation owner instead. Had absolutely no clue as to how the game was changing because of the “collapse” of the Reserve Clause.

When Gil Hodges and then Mrs. Payson died, Grant ended up making the GM ‘s job a joke in terms of acquisitions and salaries! A real POS.

As a matter of fact SA later admitted he was wrong with Reyes (box of chocolates) and said he would look to trade or extend Dickey and not wait until he and DW were FA.

So, consider it a concept or framework. With continuous improvement (adjustments) along the way to address needs.

You can’t run a team with blinders on, but you do have to run it within your $ constraints, and with an eye on the big picture of where your talent is on the development spectrum.

I was never enamored with Michael Bourn and certainly not for 4 years with an option.

Byrd and Cowgill will be decent stopgaps but not the answer. I think Byrd will be an everyday guy and Cowgill and Kirk will platoon.

http://www.miserablemetsfansunitetogripeabouteverythingtheorganizationdoesbutclaimwearethetruemetfansandanyonewhodisagreeswithusknowsnothingaboutbaseball.com

Home of fair and balanced NY Mets analysis!

Remember, there were some lean years before the winning started in which Stick Michael rebuilt the franchise.

All those guys were important, but with the exception of CC, A-Rod and Tex, all of them were secondary talent to complement the ace in Pettitte, the perennial all stars in Jeter and Williams and the best reliever in world.

Assuming the 2014 team is able to contend – which is part of the plan, I suppose – that means that attendance and thus revenue should rise again to allow for a higher budget in 2015 – and thus open up more payroll space. Again, let alone SNY gains. Just because you´ve decided to split up SNY, Citifield and the Mets into three different enteties also shouldn´t mean that you can´t view those three companies as one financially. Because they´re very much dependant on each other.

For example:

Option 1:
Mets lose 10 million and win 75 games
Citifeld loses 40 million
SNY- Wilpon / Katz share gains 50 million
net gain: break even

Option 2:
Mets lose 25 million and win 90 games
Citifield loses 40 million
SNY – Wilpon / Katz share gains 75 million
net gain: 10 million

Which business model do you prefer ?

Of course, there´s also Option 3:
Mets lose 70 million and win 80 games
Citifield loses 40 million
SNY – Wilpon / Katz share gains 60 million
net loss: 50 million

Option 3 probably isn´t sustainable. Still, it means you cannot truely isolate these three enteties from one another. They very much depend on each other. And you need to find a business model where the goal at least needs to be “break even” if you view these operations as a whole. I´m not aware of the exact numbers. But all I know is that a) the Wilpons´ just received another 150 million $ loan during their latest restructuring of SNY debt while paying the same monthly rates, benefiting from low interest rates and b) that the Mets will receive an extra 10+ million annually, starting in 2014 from the new National TV deal which almost doubles what MLB franchises will receive and are in parts to blame for the salary explosion this winter.

At the same time, the Mets have reset their 2014 payroll to a level where even as an isolated entety, the Wilpons would probably make significant gains.

So if the goal is a sustainable run for several years, this is a trade that 30 out of 30 mlb GMs would have made without even thinking about it in the Mets position.

I don´t think Alderson was aware that the financial situation would be that bad in late 2010.
Yet, the general idea probably was the same. But Alderson probably believed that he´d have more flexibility for 2012 and 2013. That´s assuming that the talk about a 110 to 115 million $ payroll in 2012 wasn´t PR BS from the getgo.

Something certainly changed during the 2011 season. And Reyes may have been a casualty in all of this. Because the Reyes´ contract – while certainly risky based on Reyes´ history – was absolutely in line with what the market value should have been compared to others and certainly not excessive. Giving Reyes that sort of contract should have been possible – but maybe the Picard case, higher than expected operating losses in 2011 and the general state of the Wilpon estate at that time led to the budget shrinking from 110 to 95 million. And thus sealed Reyes´ departure. In any case, losing Reyes for very little is the one big mistake Alderson has made during his tenure so far. And even if Kevin Plawecki and Matt Reynolds become impact major leaguers, it´ll still be the case of not maximizing the value of a player.

As for David Wright, he just turned 30 in December and is an athletic 3bman. Please take a look at the free agent classes of 2013/2014 and 2014/2015 and tell me which available hitter(s) you´d like to add if you had 15 to 25 million $ to spend on such a player or two.
Unless you want to bid with the Yankees for Robinson Cano – who is a higher risk than Wright to age poorly as a middle infielder btw – there wasn´t not going to be another bat of Wright´s caliber available in those classes. Heck, as it is, the Mets will need to fill three outfield positions going forward. And while I do believe Wilmer Flores will be a fine major league hitter, what if the vast majority of scouts is right on him and he´s “merely” a .275 BA 15 HR, .325 OBP, .450 SLG type major league bat ? Certainly a solid piece but not a bat you´re penciling into the 3rd or 4th slot of your lineup going forward. Fact is, corner position players historically have aged the best. Usually well into their mid, sometimes even late 30s. So, if you´re willing to give a longterm contract to a player who turns 30, you give it to a 3bman or 1bman based on historical evidence. And if that 3bman happens to be the face of the franchise & fan favorite, it adds another element. And if that contract is probably 20 million or so below what the player would probably get on the open market, you do it.

Oh, and by the way (though Metsie pointed it out), while FF seems like a waste of money, his signing has zero impact on the 2014 payroll.

And on a final note, as of today, the Mets will be entering the 2013/2014 off-season with a 40-man roster that features exactly one player (Wright) who already has celebrated his 30th birthday. The projected payroll for 2014 – as of today – is somewhere in the 50 to 55 million $ range if you´re bringing everybody back who isn´t eligible for free agency next winter. Even with a further decline in attendance in 2013, that´ll finally give SA the leverage to spend next off-season. Be it via free agency or in trades.