“But the bigger mistake you guys make is you keep insisting everything is all one way or the other, either a team uses sabermetric tools 100% or they don’t use them at all. ”

Is that what I did? Did I not say?:

“And though nobody should downplay the importance of being that senior advisor one should also not over-emphasize the role he played in comparison to the responsibilities that were on the shoulders of others.”

Also, did I not credit James with insisting upon acquiring Ortiz while, at the same time, bringing out how the Red Sox then discarded his plan on how to use the best reliever? And in all fairness, it had to be pointed out that the Red Sox were a team that won 93 games prior to Epstein and James. That’s why I felt it also so important to quote James when he referred to Casey Stengel and those lead off hitters he used in the world series – he knew that without the help of any advanced statistical evaluation.

Now, I was not inferring it’s all or nothing but I did include the ESPN blog to show how James looks at things way beyond stats. As you know, he is a historian and appreciates all aspects of the game. And that was my point – over emphasis of the statistical analysis because the game is still played by human beings and I think Bill James, with his love and appreciation of the game, has been saying just that. He did say a statistician should not tell one how to hit, alluding to taking more first pitches. He was also hesitant to give a deep evaluation of the Sox minor league system – recognizing his limitations. He also spoke about having to see a player to understand why he goes against the formula. And he also spoke about how often his writings are misunderstood or things attributed to him that he never said.

I know you appreciate that too. But don’t forget, I was reacting to the way it sounded when you wrote: “The Red Sox have had a top 5 payroll of years and they not only believe in sabermetric they actually employ Bill James and have since before their first WS win in 2004 and still works for them.” which sounds like it is indeed “either a team uses sabermetric tools 100% or they don’t use them at all.”. Earlier, when you wrote “Again, the Sox have been one of the most prolific and successful practitioners of sabermetrics for the last decade. It’s not a debatable topic.

Now, in fairness, you did follow that up with “And like any other team that uses sabermetrics it is only one method they use to evaluate talent.” and also wrote

“Epstein hated that the book and more importantly the movie Moneyball (which was not the name the A’s gave it) were made. He believed that the techniques a couple clubs were using gave them an advantage over teams that didn’t understand or weren’t using them. Guess what? He was right. And now sabermetric principles are being used throughout baseball.”

That is why I say I am sure you appreciate all the aspects of the game. When you put it in those words we can agree with each other for that is well thought out assessment. It’s an aid.

The problem is the emphasis on the importance of those stats that many of us have and which many times in their zeal, advocates of sabermetrics don’t recognize how they are coming across – while others do.

And with the Mets is that it is looked more than just an aid but an organizational approach to evaluating issues and resolving them. For myself, I do not believe in either traditional or advanced stats when it comes to professional evaluation for anything more than reference. The game on the field and as James said himself, one has to see a player to appreciate him.
And I agree with Tony LaRussa when he said:

“My opinion is I think a lot of people — a lot of people, not just fans, but owners — they gave it way too much credibility as far as how you scout, how you develop and then how you end up playing in the big leagues. It’s a nice tool, but that’s all it is. It’s not even as important as the human characteristic that you have to think about all the time when you play the game.”

Also, the way the game has been played has not in essence changed since the early eighties other than for more emphasis on specialized lefty/rightup match ups. In my opinion, that has hurt the game because there are more pitchers on the roster today than position players and thus benches are mostly cleared earlier in the game, not giving the manager more choices to use late in the game by so many switches….., but of course, LaRussa does not talk about his part in championing that aspects of the game.

But getting on base, platooning, relieving (other than to the extreme mentioned above), defensive positioning, advancing base runners, when to use the hit and run, playing the infield in, etc. has not changed.

I do believe another problem facing the game is depending so much more on statistical analysis to get players to be different than they are – something James touched upon himself and something the Mets have been doing which has not only affected individuals but also messed up team hitting by what Bob Ojeda pointed out about telegraphing their less aggressive approach early in the count. And it wasn’t just Ojeda. LaRussa said this about working the pitch count as well:

“On-base percentage is one of the most dangerous concepts of the last seven, eight years because it forces some executives and coaches and players to think that it’s all about getting on base by drawing walks. And the fact is that the guys that have the best on-base percentage are really dangerous hitters whenever they get a pitch in the strike zone.

“So if the pitcher knows that and the catcher knows that, they work the edges, and pretty soon it’s 2-and-1, 2-and-1 rather than 0-and-1 all the time.

“You watch your productive hitters in the big leagues, and they get a chance to drive in a run, they look for the first good strike, and the better the pitching, especially this time of the year, you get that first strike, that may be the last one that you get to see. So you’d better be ready to swing early. It’s not sitting up there and taking strike one, strike two so that you can work the count.’’

That’s why we see things differently on stats and why those like Sandy Alderson when put in charge of a club actually hurts it more than helps it.

As much as I am devoted to the Mets, there is no better place to watch a game on a sunny summer afternoon than Fenway. For those who have never been, put it on your bucket list. I guarantee you won’t be disappointed.

If the analysis you make which may include sabermetrics as it did with the Sox says you need to go after player X and player X is the highest paid guy at his position, guess what, you pay the money. Unless you are a small market team like Oakland or are otherwise cash strapped like the Mets and can’t afford it.

During Epstein’s tenure the Sox used 19 different starters at shortstop. 19 guys in less than 10 years. It was THE position of instability with the Sox despite the fact they were still able to squeak out a couple World Series championships. Besides, I’m told by you Core guys that spending money doesn’t matter as long as you win, amiright?

One of the big reasons Epstein is no longer with the Sox is because he started going off the reservation toward the end. He started handing out huge contracts for guys like Lugo in attempt at not only plugging the hole at shortstop but also what he referred to as “feeding the beast”. The beast being success. Once the Sox started winning the pressure to keep on winning was intense. If you’ve never experienced Red Sox Nation its hard to explain. The Mets have fans, the Sox have cultists. The Sox own New England, from Maine to Connecticut. The Mets don’t even own NYC.

No GM or system is perfect. Not Alderson, not Epstein and not Omar. They all face different challenges and have different players to choose from. In a competitive game like baseball where everyone for the most part is trying to pick a team from the same pool of players, why would you choose to not use the information you can get from sabermetric analysis when evaluating players particularly when your competition is?

The problem is the point you have been trying to make is wrong. The only reason people bring up the name Bill James is because he is considered the father of sabermetrics. Far fewer people know John Henry, owner of the Sox and a very vocal supporter of sabermetrics since before he owned the team or Theo Epstein, ex GM or know that he is also a huge devotee of sabermetrics. If you don’t believe me go ask the Chicago Cubs who lured Epstein away from the Sox for $19 million specifically because of his knowledge of of the analytics of sabermetrics.

Here’s the title of one article announcing his arrival.

>>Epstein one of best deciphering numbers
>>His arrival will enhance Cubs’ move toward analytics, sabermetrics

http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-10-16/sports/ct-spt-1017-cubs-carmine–20111017_1_sabermetrics-cubs-convention-chairman-tom-ricketts

You’ll notice that you missed one very important name when listing the Red Sox front office (incidentally it would be awesome to see one of you Core types show as much knowledge of the Mets front office instead of just screaming sabergooner all the time). That name is Carmine, the computer program Epstein wrote to analysis players using sabermetric principles. Carmine is still with the Sox.

Epstein hated that the book and more importantly the movie Moneyball (which was not the name the A’s gave it) were made. He believed that the techniques a couple clubs were using gave them an advantage over teams that didn’t understand or weren’t using them. Guess what? He was right. And now sabermetric principles are being used throughout baseball.

I’m pretty familiar with the Red Sox. I live 6 blocks from Fenway and the Sox aren’t just a baseball team in New England, they are a religion. Almost as famous as the team are the sportswriters for the Boston Globe who covered the team for years and many of them went on to form leadership of Sports Illustrated. I know exactly where I was when the ball went through Buckner’s legs, the Cask ‘n Flagon right next to Fenway. That was most glorious night of wailing and despair I’ve ever been through.

But the bigger mistake you guys make is you keep insisting everything is all one way or the other, either a team uses sabermetric tools 100% or they don’t use them at all. That’s dumb. I’ve been tuna fishing with the same group of guys for decades. We use a lot of the tools and techniques we learned from people who came before us to find and catch the fish. But we also incorporate new techniques, electronics, advanced charting, etc.. Life is rarely all black or all white but 50 or so shades of grey (that’s for the ladies). Of course the Sox didn’t use every piece of James’ advice. And Epstein as GM didn’t get every player he asked for. It never works that way.

For the life of me I don’t get this hatred for incorporating new tools into a teams arsenal to help them better evaluate players. It’s like people raging against those infernal new combustion engine contraptions as they stood astride their horse and buggy. It is one tool among many but not using something that provides uniques insight into players capabilities would be dumb.

“The Red Sox have had a top 5 payroll of years and they not only believe in sabermetric they actually employ Bill James and have since before their first WS win in 2004 and still works for them.”

The point you raise about Bill James represents the exact point many of us have been making regarding misunderstanding the roles one plays with the club.

In 2004 James was asked what his job was with the Red Sox on an ESPN blog:

QUESTION: Mr. James, How would you describe your duties to the Red Sox?

JAMES: My job, as best I understand it, is to create systematic ways of thinking about real-life front office problems which are useful to the Red Sox organization.

Now, I do believe James was being a bit humorous and, in a sarcastic way, modest with his answer, however, he did not have decision making authority – he was not the general manager, an assistant general manager, nor did he oversee baseball operations, player development or scouting. He served as a special advisor to the general manager.

And though nobody should downplay the importance of being that senior advisor one should also not over-emphasize the role he played in comparison to the responsibilities that were on the shoulders of others. This was also a team that had won 93 games the year before he was hired.

Yes, he has been noted as urging the Sox to sign David Ortiz but at the same time the Sox tried and then rejected his theory that relief aces should be used earlier in games, for example, if the score was tied in the seventh, rather than being saved for the ninth with a lead of two or more runs. The Red Sox were not noted for having strong bullpens in 2003 and 2004. In May of 2003, Boston obtained Byung-Hyun Kim and after a few starts, he turned into the teams’ best reliever – and eventually used exclusively as closer. The following year the Red Sox relief ace was Keith Foulke and in all his 72 appearances, he never came into the game earlier than the 8th inning.

So please keep in mind the responsibilities of the individual – which is more important than one’s title – when attributing team success. Your reference to the Sox having hired James make his contributions appear more than they were. As you will see in the link below, he even said his knowledge of the team’s prospects was limited – even though he was into his second season with the team (the tip off about the date being his mentioning of Dave Meintk (never could spell his name correctly) who was not obtained by Boston until mid-season, 2004) – so he was not heavily into player development. We know Theo Epstein was hired as GM the same time he was.

BTW – this is the front office breakdown for the Sox in 2004:

Larry Lucchino President/Chief Executive Officer
Theo Epstein General Manager
Mike Port VP, Baseball Operations – Assistant GM
Josh Byrnes Assistant GM
Bill Lajoie Special Assistant to GM/Scouting
Craig Shipley Special Assistant to GM/Player Development
Bill James Senior Baseball Operations Advisor – Special Assistant to the GM
Peter Woodfork Director, Baseball Operations/Assistant Director, Player Development,
Baseball Operations
Jed Hoyer Baseball Operations Assistant
Ben Cherington Director of Player Development
David Chadd Director, Amateur Scouting
Thomas Moore Assistant Director, Professional/International Scouting Minor League
Operations

http://espn.go.com/sportsnation/chat/_/id/3503

http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/top50prospects_2004_parttwo/

the longer u wait to sign…typically…the more leverage the player has…

if the player doesnt want to take a chance…after taking a chance for almost 1,000 games….than he will sign…

the red sox ability to absorb bad contracts enabled Theo to win in 2007, had Omar made those same terrible moves, he would’ve had to play those guys almost their entire tenure.

and when they came on, the FIRST thing Theo attempted to do was trade for the biggest contract in all of baseball…and that was after he got the best and most expensive RHP in the NL

and 2 years after he came on board…the red sox media was running him out of Boston in a gorilla suit

Sabermetrics is a tool to help evaluate performance, it has nothing to do with team payroll.

Sure, they’ll still be setbacks and plenty of angry fans looking for instant gratification, but this is the Mets…not the Yankees. There’s literally 5 to 8 more great young arms staggered throughout the minor leagues. When this season’s minor league roster is set, Mets’ fans can be excited that at each level, they’ll be a couple of legit, high ceiling arms in the rotation. From Wheeler and Mejia in Vegas, all the way to Flexen and Oswalt in K-Port. The Cyclone’s boasted 5 such arms just last year! This doesn’t just end once Wheeler gets promoted.

The only sticking point is just how serious was Fred Wilpon when he said the Mets were financially capable to once again sign the needed free agents to fill out this team and is Sandy Alderson capable of out bidding anyone in order to make those much needed upgrades.

Again, the Sox have been one of the most prolific and successful practitioners of sabermetrics for the last decade. It’s not a debatable topic. And like any other team that uses sabermetrics it is only one method they use to evaluate talent.

And it has nothing to do with money.

Sell them fear in order to get them at a cheap rate early. Very good.