Rickey’s own words kind of prove that “Rickey did not “rely on deep statitical analysis. Many years before Alderson was in diapers” or that he was even “the first to first executive to utilize statistical analysis”

Rickey himself stated in that article that he always used “accepted statistcal methods” prior to being approached by LIFE magazine. So he was not the first. He was doing what others were doing as well.

And hen first approached on the idea of what would mean “deeper statistical analysis” he said “When LIFE first asked me six months ago if the development of such a formula was possible, I expressed serious doubts”.

He then concluded: “But recently I came upon a device for measuring baseball which has compelled me to put different values on some of my most cherished and valued theories. It reveals some new and startling truths about the nature of the game”.

So it was indeed when LIFE approached him with an idea that he went into and then it “compelled” him to “put different values” into what he knew about the game.

So from that article it is established that Rickey had not relied on different statistical methodology anymore than others and also cannot be credited as the first to use statistical analysis at all, despite what was attribute What he did was look at the results differently than others. And yes, by then creating a new and deeper formula he learned things but as I also showed, there were other innovators were actually ahead of him at the time. Everyone was learning and the game was evolving.

What is true is that he “also pioneered the use of statistical analysis in baseball (what is now known as sabermetrics)” but this is completely different than saying he “relied” on it simply because his innovation came at the very end of his baseball career. He didn’t. He relied on what he called the “accepted” standards of his age.

And though he saw OBP being more important than batting average, as that chart provided by baseball reference shows an increase in OBP during the late forties and early fifties throughout baseball so it wasn’t just Rickey appreciating getting on base. And after that short period, the range in OBP over batting average returned to the same basic ratio that we know today (minus the steroid and expanded strike zone eras) over the past seventy years or so. So his findings did not lead to any increase in getting on base other than a hit – again, because the goal of the batter is not to make out. And with Rickey himself pointing out how much pride Ted Williams took with the amount of walks it shows how just getting on base itself was appreciated by a lifetime .346 hitter.

Also, regarding platooning, how could Roth “provide statistical evidence that platoon effects were real and quantifiable” if the platoon strategy had not yet been adopted? There would be no “statistical evidence” for him to base anything on. By stats Roth confirmed what many managers already knew was working.

Those are nice little tidbits about McGraw, Stengel and lefty-righty splits but that’s not really what Rickey was doing. He was looking at stats to determine how best to build an offense proficient for scoring runs and for pitching and defense to deter runs. So yes it is very true. He did it later in his career but he was still the first executive to do so.

http://baseballhall.org/hof/rickey-branch

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Branch_Rickey

“Branch continued being an innovator in his time with Brooklyn. He was responsible for the first full time spring training facility, in Vero Beach, Florida, and encouraged the use of now-commonplace tools such as the batting cage, pitching machines, and batting helmets. He also pioneered the use of statistical analysis in baseball (what is now known as sabermetrics), when he hired statistician Allan Roth as a full-time analyst for the Dodgers in 1947. After viewing Roth’s evidence, Rickey promoted the idea that on-base percentage was a more important hitting statistic than batting average.[9] While working under Rickey, Roth was also the first person to provide statistical evidence that platoon effects were real and quantifiable”

FALSE.

The article was written in August of 1954. HE WAS ASKED BY LIFE MAGAZINE SIX MONTHS BEFORE THE ARTICLE WAS PUBLISHED TO SEE IF SUCH FORMULAS WERE POSSIBLE. Not before that.

“When LIFE first asked me six months ago if the development of such a formula was possible, I expressed serious doubts” Rickey wrote in that article.

He also came upon those formulas THE LAST YEAR BEFORE HE RETIRED due to health problems. So he relied on “deep statistical analysis” for, at most, TWO MONTHS!

So to say he RELIED on deep statistical analization is a complete fabrication. If one said he discovered new ways of understanding teams and individuals through formulation as the very end of his career that would be another story.

But also remember who he was writing to – the readers of LOOK magazine and the baseball fan. The importance of the factors Rickey then discovered were not so much overlooked by generations before him as the game was evolving.
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John McGraw acknowledged the right/lefty factor back in the twenties. Rickey mentioned how proud Ted Williams was of the amount of walks he was able to draw. The Yankees went against tradition of those in the bullpen being ones who couldn’t make it as a starter with Joe Paige in the forties. By the early fifties it was no secret with Dodger fans that Duke Snyder had problems hitting lefties (how bad, however, it could not be determined). Casey Stengel had already incorporated platoons, lineup changes, etc. before that time.which led to five straight Yankee world championships.

So it wasn’t just Branch Rickey. He was among many who were smarter in the game than others and quicker to adapt (Rickey himself developed the modern day farm system and broke the color barrier). Rickey developed formulas that proved some things that even he was surprised about, but just based on the few examples above, there were other innovators were actually ahead of him at the time.

Also, his stats about slugging, etc. were more for argumentive about who was better at what.

And don’t forget the limitations of stats as brought out by Rickey, the “unmeasurable factors” from Rogers Hornsby’s arrogance to Babe Ruth’s eyesight.

SO TO IMPLY THAT BRANCH RICKEY RELIED ON DEEP STATISTICAL ANALYSIS IS COMPLETELY UNTRUE. . He was already a front office executive with the St. Louis Browns in 1913 – 41 years before he was approached by LIFE to attempt to develop such formulas.and said before that he relied on his observation.

P.S. The point had been raised about every team today using a statistician. But that does not mean statisticians were not employed in the past. Alan Roth was already with Brooklyn and assisted Rickey with the assignment given to him by LIFE and that was sixty years ago. He wasn’t alone either.

Even if you get value the year you have signed him you wind up paying more for it the next year if not for the player who was good then for someone to replace the hole from them leaving.

If they are worth having for a year because they are cheap then sign them for two.

I keep going back to this but right now Pena in the minors has had more professional experience catching than Thole. In terms of a catcher he is still very inexperienced.

I cant blame Sandy for playing Jason Bay in LF anymore than I can blame Omar for the Beltran fiasco…

the wilpons ARE the problem